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the interplay of cognitive and normative factors. The paper concludes with a recommendation
to use organisation theory more systematically in the study of de facto international
organisations.
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Introduction
Institutional approaches do not only provide theories and methods for studying
domestie politics and policies; they may also supply fruitful means of studying
international relations and organisations. The field of international relations has
passed through various phases of emphasis wherein institutional approaches at
certain times have been dominant and at other times been relegated to the
periphery of academic interest. What has counted as an institutional approach at
one time may have been overshadowed by other institutional approaehes at other
times. Institutional approaches have not only competed with other approaehes in
giving the most adequate account of international relations; intern al competition
has been as conspicuous for the title of the institutional approach.
Considering that the field of international relations is in continuous evolvement, I
shall not give any introductory definition of what an institutional approach is,
provided that there is one, and I shall be more concerned with usages and
changing and evolving usages of that term. As I shall be concerned with evolving
usages, I shall first give a historical overview of the field as it has developed in
this century, employing some of the periodisations of academic emphasis known
from recent literature. This overview wil serve the purpose of highlighting the
dominant approaches within the field at different points in time and thereby
indicating the relative standing of institutional approaches at these different points
in time. The review wil show that institutionalism as an approach has returned to
the foreground after a long period of relative neglect, but also that what defines
the approach in recent literature has changed substantially from what defined it at
the outset, particularly as regards methodology. However, certain basic
assumptions as to the normative role of institutions have remained fairly constant
over the period.
After the historical overview I shall review the currently contending institutional
approaehes and discuss what are the epistemological and normative defining
features of these current approaehes. Emphasising epistemological features would
clearly be in line with the emphasis these approaehes themselves put on cognitive
matters and with the epistemological and methodological pluralism within the
field in recent years. The normative defining features, which do not appear to have
changed substantially, would throw light upon what are the desirable states of
affairs in international relations and how these normative concerns influence
certain basic assumptions of the approach. In fact, I hope to show that these
epistemqlogical and normative features tend towards convergence, opening up
some interesting lines of research. What these lines of research might be is the
topic for the concluding section.
In this paper I do not pretend to speak of the field of international relations per se.
What is of interest is the sub-field of international organisation or more broadly,
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international cooperation. The institutional approach is not limited to the study of
actually existing organisations, which may be a reason for complaint as we shall
see, but encompasses the study of any type of international cooperation for which
there may not be an existing organisation or an envisaged or planned one. The
approach may also favour sectoral studies and thereby be more concerned with
interorganisational relations than with any organisation in particular. Finally, the
approach may take on an advocacy role, drawing upon principled beliefs, pointing
to fields and sectors where co-operation is laeking and organisation is not
immnent.
Phases in the study of international organisation
Attempts at periodisation are dependent on what is thought to be the core or the
nucleus of the field. If core assumptions vary, so wil evaluations of the course the
field has been takng. Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) regard the core of the field as
consisting in the study of international governance, however it is to be defined,
and the development of the field has consisted in aseriesof progressive analytical
shifts around this core. Rochester (1986) sees the core as being the study of
international organisation in the more narow sense of formal arangements
transcending national boundaries providing for the establishment of institutional
machinery to faciltate cooperation among members in certain specified fields.
Kratochwil and Ruggie's periodisation lists a number of progressive analytical
shifts. The "original" perspective was the formal institutional focus. The
assumption was that international governanee was whatever international
organisations did and whatever they did was to be found by studying their
constitutional mandate, organisational structure and working procedures. The
actual functioning of the organisation could be assessed as to how closely they
approximated their mandate. However, this focus could not adequately explain
why organisational practices might be different from what the constitutional
mandate would prescribe, so the first analytical shift was made in the direction of
studying actual institutional processes, patterns of influence and powers over
decision-makng, in general, degrees of controlover organisational outcomes.
Both these approaehes treated international organisations as their dependent
variable, but they differed in explaining what it was that made them work the way
they did. This difference in explanation may be explained by the disciplinar bases
of the two approaches. The first approach was dominated by legal scholars who
brought their methodologies to bear on the field of study, whereas the second was
dominated by scholars tníÍned in the behavioural sciences. The shift was in the
methodological sense characterised by a shift from prescriptions for behaviour to
predietions of behaviour.
The third phase, or second progressive analytical shift, was, according to
Kratochwil and Ruggie, marked by shifting international organisations from being
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dependent variables to being independent variables. The focus was now on
organisational roles or inputs to the process of international governance. These
roles might be conceived as organisational contributions to sol ving substantive
problems on the international arena such as peace-makng. Organisational roles
might also be conceived in slightly different ways, and one conception was the
extent to which international organisations provided functional solutions to
substantive problems that could not be solved through available institutional
means, neither domestically nor through the existing mandated tasks of the
international organisations. This neo-functionalist, integrationist approach foresaw
a contributory role for the international organisations in creatively adapting to the
new functional requirements of international problem-solving. Finally, an
organisational role might be co ne ei ved of as a forum, arena or even an instrument
for members to engage in whatever way is deemed useful for whatever purpose.
The role of the organisations would be to lend legitimacy to outcomes that would
otherwise have been reached unilaterally orbilaterally at a presumed co st in
legitimacy. Uniting these various conceptions of organisational roles is a
presumption of their contributing to solving problems of international governanee
by adapting to the requirements of the problem (and its solution) at hand.
The fourth phase, or the third analytical shift, brings us up to date in the sense that
the international regime research focus is very much a current preoccupation with
researchers. We shall have more to say about that in the next section. Whereas
Kratochwil and Ruggie see a progression of shifts in the analysis of a core notion
of international governance, Rochester (1986) sees something akn to aregressive
distanciation from the initial core focus on formal international organisations. The
effect of that distanciation has resulted in theoretical confusion as well as in
practical irrelevanee in the sense of loss of abilty to influence policy-makng
nationally and internationally and corresponding loss of interest among
policy-makers and media in the outputs of the research community. Loss of
relevance has been combined with weak predictive capabilty as theorists have
offered post-event explanations rather than pre-event predictions. While
Kratochwil and Ruggie agree with Rochester in observing the widening gap
between international organisation as a field of study and as a field of practice, the
former do not necessarily see that observation as reflecting a disadvantage as far
as research is concerned. 1
For Rochester the field of international organisation as an object of study
originated with the establishment of the League of N ations in 1920 and the
research focus in the inter-w ar period was stronglyonInstitution-building with
descriptive, narrative accounts wedded to normative proposals for improvements
in institution-building. This "idealist" approach was increasingly challenged by
1 As they note, "today, international organisation as a field of study is an area where the action is;
few would so characterise international organisations a field of practice" (Kratochwil and
Ruggie, 1986: 753).
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the "realist" approach toward the end of this period, epitomised by the publication
in 1939 of E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis. Even if these scholars' readings
of how to achieve the optimal combination of the desirable with the possible
differed, they shared a practical concern with the minimisation of conflct and the
maximisation of international co-operation in a decentralised state system. They
differed in how to achieve this objective with one school stressing international
institutional means and the other the traditional means of diplomacy and stateeraft.
It is Rochester' s contention that this practical concern has steadily evaporated in
the post-war period. His periodisation does not differ all that much from that of
Kratochwil and Ruggie as he also sees a series of shifts in substantive research
focus. Where he does differ, though, is that he does not see these shifts as
involving progressions in analytical insight or, as noted, in practical applicability).
He divides the post-war period into four sub-periods, each with a dominant
research focus. The 1945-60 period was. dominated by studies of the United
Nations with regional integration an ascendant, but not yet dominant, theme
primarily centred on European integration processes.
The next period, 1960-70 sees UN studies waning and regional integration
dominating toward the end of the period, shifting attention from global issues and
institutions to regional issues and institutions. This shift in attention came in
various theoretical guises, some stressing federalist solutions, others
neo-functionalist solutions, by institutions adapting to the new problem
definitions, as we noted above, and others yet again stressing transactions, which
may involve communications, trade and other trans action flows, thereby
downgrading the role of international institutions, but not leaving them out
altogether or failng to acknowledge their uses. This period also saw the highpoint
of behaviourist methodology with normative theory pushed to the background of
social science analysis.
The third period, 1970-80, sees a return to global concerns and a waning of
interest in regional integration. This globalist paradigm was not deri ved or
resulting from the cumu1ative findings of previous research, but again appears to
be in response to events in the outside world, in particular to concern with the
"limits to growth" and the oil crÏsis. As these problems and others of a similar
nature showed regional solutions to be inadequate to the new problem definition,
regional integration theory was no longer profitable as a distinct intellectual
pursuit and was in that sense obsolete, according to one of its former proponents,
Ernst B: Haas (1976: 174). Itdid not make the study oÍ'Tegionalism superfluous,
but injected a dose of modest y and perhaps, realism, into what could thereby be
exp1ained. Given the new problem definition, and assuming it to be valid, the
specific institutional solution provided by regional integration theory was now less
functional to the problem at hand.
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Renewed interest in global issues did not signal a return to the study of
international organisations as traditionally conceived. Instead, there is a
proliferation of definitions as international organisation now covers entities
ranging from multinational corporations to networks of non-governmental
organisations. The attention shifted to clusters and networks in which the existing
international organisations only form one node or several nodes in different
clusters and networks. The globalist paradigm also signified a return to normative
concerns, but of a slightly different type than those of the original "idealists". The
international organisations were not automatically seen as an important part of the
solution, but rather as a part of the problem, given their implicit acceptance of the
prevailing system of states. The globalist paradigm also signalled a dissatisfaction,
if not a rejection of behaviourist methodology, as prescriptive analysis again came
to the forefront, at least among certain scholars.
As this,overview has attempted to show, researchattemption hasprogressively (or
regressively, depending upon your evaluation) moved away from the study of
existing international organisations to the study of less formalised patterns of
cooperation. Hence, the institutional approach has shifted from the study of
mandates, rules and working procedures characteristic of actually existing
organisations to the study of international governanee for which there may or may
not be an organisational outlet. The 1980s marked the shift to the study of
international regimes and to that we now turn.
International regimes: problems of conceptualisation
The study of international regimes represents a diversified attempt to synthesise
the dominant trends in the study of international organisation. On the one hand,
the approach favoured by internationallaw was relegated to the sidelines, due to
the incessant criticism by the realism school of international relations and its
assumption of the anarchical nature of international society. On the other hand,
realist theory was criticised by scholars working within the field of international
political economy as offering an inadequate account of international relations by
neglecting the interdependent nature of national economies. Consequently, a
balance of sorts was struck in the notion of a regime by looking at types of
international cooperation at a less formallevel than organisations while keeping a
realist perspective by investigating under whIch conditions international
cooperation was advantageous for state actors.
The concept of an international regime has been defined'Ìn various ways. One
commonly cited definition is the one offered by Krasner (1982: 185), according to
which a regime consists of "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-makng procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a
given area. of international relations". These four defining features are further
defined as follows: "Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms
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are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-makng procedures are
prevailing practices for makng and implementing collective choice" (1982: 186).
A somewhat wider definition of a regime is given by Puchala and Hopkins who
argue that "a regime exists in every substantive area in international relations
where there is a discernible patterned behaviour. Wherever there is regularity in
behaviour, norms or rules must exist to account for it (1982: 247). This definition
essentially begs the question of rule-governed behaviour as regularity surely
cannot be equated with rules (or even less with norms and principles). For
behaviour to be rule-governed, actors would have to be aware of a certain practice
as defined by rules and recognise it as so defined and not regard rules merelyas
descriptions of their actual behaviour.2
A narrower definition is given by Strange, citingKeohane and Nye, in which
"regimes are networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularise behaviour
and control its effects", taking it to mean "explicit or implicit internationally
agreed arangements, usually executed with the aid of an international
organisation" (1982: 485). This definition in contrast to the wider definition cited
above would not assume (or derive) norms and rules on the basis of patterned
behaviour, but would rather assess behaviour in terms of compliance (or
deviation) from explicitly acknowledged rules.
The Krasner definition occupies the middle ground in this respect by stressing
converging expectations rather than actual agreements or patterned behaviour.
However, occupying the middle ground does not necessarily solve conceptual
problems. As pointed out by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 764ff., the
definitional emphasis put on "converging expectations" would seem to hint at a
strong intersubjective element. In their phrase, the "ontology" of regimes is
founded on "principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable
forms of behaviour".3 However, the "epistemology" of regimes is not built on a
methodology that allows for exploring the intersubjective element of shared
meanings. Structuralist theory features actors as determined by objective, systemic
forces while the opposite approach associated with game theory takes interests as
given prior to interaction and does not provide for the possibility that
intersubjective meaning and shared understandings only can come about through
(and resulting from) interaction.
Furthermore,the Krasner definition does not solve the problem of the status of
principles, norms and rules around which actors' expectations converge.
Expectations can be of an empirical or of a normative nature. In the former case
2 See Young's (1986: 119) discussion and citation of Rawls' two concepts ofrules (1955: 24).
3 Their understanding of ontology is similar to Walzer's (1983) concept of shared understandings
as defining spheres of justice, although he is not mentioned in their review.
6
you would have reasons to believe that the actor would behave in certain ways,
based, say, on past performance, and you would therefore be in a position to
predict the actor' s future behaviour with some confidence. In the latter case, you
are not interested in whether your predictions are validated or not; in fact, you
expect the actor to behave in certain ways as a matter of prescription (or even
demand). Hence, causes of behaviour are of less interest than whether the acts
were in compliance with norms or not. Causation may not be the correct term in
these instances. It may be more appropriate to speak of reasons and justifications
for acting in certain ways and only of causation in the sense of acts resulting in
unintended effects. Moreover, as noted by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 767),
explanation in terms of causes can be invalidated be showing that the actor did not
act as you predieted, but you would not invalidate a norm if the actor did not act
according to it. Norms would only be invalidated if non-compliance were of such
a magnitude that the norms can no longer be seen as prescribing behaviour. These
elaborations indicate that the status of norms in regime theory are far from settled,
and we shall return to this topic in the next section by looking at norms in
international relations theory generally.
Regimes would have to distinguished from institutions and organisations.
International institutions are, according to Y oung, "practices composed of
recognised roles coupled with sets of rules or conventions governing relations
among the occupants of these roles" whereas organisations are "physical entities
possessing offices, personneI, equipment, budgets and so forth" (1986: 108). The
latter definition should be fairly straightforward, but as for the former, one may
wonder how institutions are to be differentiated from regimes as Y oung previously
has defined an essential feature of institutions to be "the conjunction of
convergent expectations" (1979: 17). Under what conditions would such a
conjunction produce an institution, regime or organisation? Is it possible to
specify which processes result in regimes (and/or institutions) and which
processes result in an organisation? These problems are far from resolved in
regime theory and Haggard has noted that "recent regimes literature has largely
ignored problems of organisational design and operation". Design and operation
are in Haggard and Simmons' s view a functIon of the degree of complexity of the
task: "Complex cooperative tasks require more elaborate, and potentially
autonomous, organisational structures. If cooperation is already highly
institutionalised, theories resting on assumptIons of anarchy are highly misleading;
blackboxing organisational structure and processes wil lead to simplistic
predictions" (1987: 496ff.. More than that, the predietions wil be irrelevant.
Organisational design is also, as they note, related to the. scope of the regime,
meaning the range of issues it is set to handle, and to its mode of allocation, where
authoritative allocation would caU for more extensive and autonomous
organisational structures than would a purely market-oriented regime.
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So far, we have been concerned with definitional matters. Haggard and Simmons
do also give an overview of theoretical approaehes to regimes. Some of these
approaches are of interest to questions we would like to pursue in later sections of
this paper. The four approaches are grouped as follows: Structural,
game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. The structural approach, which is of
less concern to us here, has linked regime strength and stabilty to the presenee of
a hegemonial power and regimes are accordingly weakened by the weakening of
the hegemonial power. Tests of this assumption have found that this is not
necessarily the case.4 Game-theoretic approaches have the advantage of specifying
under which conditions regimes may arise from cooperation, but, as noted above,
are disadvantaged in explaining organisational form and scope and the rules and
norms guiding organisational operations and organisational change.
Some of the same problems haunt functionalist theory as well as it tends to
highlight the demand side,. seeing regimes as functional solutions to coordination
problems, particularly those of trans action costs. But saying that regimes are
functionally required given market faIlure does not imply saying that regimes
would thereby be supplied. As Haggard and Simmons point out, "even if we knew
that every regime performed some specified set of functions, this knowledge
would not explain why regimes emerge in some issue-areas and not in others. Nor
would it explain why some regimes develop impressive formal organisations,
while others do not". In paricular, they would like to see more work that would
show "how particular contracting problems may yield particular governance
solutions" and for work along these lines to "distinguish clearly between
institutions and organisations" (1987: 508). Even though functionalist theory is an
advance on game theory in the sense of showing regimes to be functionally
required, its conceptual foundation is stil too thin to yield determinate
predictions.
A conceptually thicker grounding is given by cognitive approaches which
emphasises ideology, the values and beliefs of the actors and the knowledge
needed for them to reach their goals. This approach tends to be strong on the
substantive content of regime rules and on the capacity of actors for learning, thus
giving a stronger dynamic to this approach than the two former which either adopt
determinist positions or take agents' preferences to be given (and thus unaffected
by learning). This approach is not without faults, however. By stressing ideas and
consensual knowledge and values, it downplays conflcts of interest and power
relations and in a sense yields indeterminate predictions by not specifying what
governanee solutions would. result fromconsensual knowledge and values and
what solutions, if any, would result from dissensual knowledge and values. As this
approach is stronger on contextual factors, highlighting contingency and
path-dependence, its predictive capacity may accordingly be weakened. But as we
4 For arecent example, see Crone's (1993) analysis of the Pacific political economy and the
APEC regime.
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said above with reference to regime ontology and epistemology, that short -coming
may not be as disadvantageous as those of the other approaches. However, as this
approach makes room for integrating cognitive and normative factors, whïch is of
interest to us here, it may warrant a doser examination. That is the topic of the
next section.
Cognitive and normative convergencies
One way to integrate cognitive and normative factors in the study of international
relations is to acknowledge that ideas have a role in explaining behaviour and
outcomes. Put succinctly by Goldstein and Keohane, "ideas influence policy when
the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase
actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes
of strategic situations in whïch there is no unique equilibrium and when they
become embedded in political.institutions" (1983: 3). Saying that ideas matter
does not mean that interests do not matter, too; both are thought to have causal
weight in explaining actions and outcomes.
Ideas have not figured prominently in international relations theory as explanatory
devices. Both realist theory and liberal institutionalist theory share a basic
assumption of maximisation of utility, though the setting of maximisation differs
in the two theories. The liberal institutionalist theory sees utilty maximisation in a
con text of mutual gain whereas realist theory sees utility maximisation in a
context of a zero-sum game where one party's gain is the other party's loss. Both
theories concur in that interests, defined in terms of wealth or power, are the
determining factor in human action and that ideas are best conceived of as
belonging to the region of "unexplained variance".
Ideas figure prominently, however, in reflectivist (or constructivist) theory 5 which
tends to focus on interactions that are constitutive of both identities and interests
and that also revise and change these identitÏes and interests. Interests (or
preferences) are according to this theory endogenous in the sense that they are
constituted and revised through various types of interactÏons. We shall return to
this theory below, but suffice it to say here that this approach is not the one
advocated by Goldstein and Keohane though they profess to have reaped some
insights from it. Theirs is an explanatory enterprise wherein their main hypothesis
is how much of the variatÏon in policy is explained by changes in factors other
than ideas. By holding ideas constant, variance in terms of policy outcomes can
then b~ explained by interests of'other factors thought to exert influence.
Ideas for Goldstein and Keohane come in three categories. Human action is
ultimately conditioned by worldviews embedded in cultures, but with the proviso
that these worldviews are non-fatalistic, i.e. they allow for human beings to be
5 The latter term is the one preferred by Wendt (1987,1992), one theorist within this approach
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active agents in the construction of their identities. Secondly, ideas may be
characterised as principled beliefs which consist of "normative ideas that specify
criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust" and in that
capacity "mediate between world views and paricular policy conclusions; they
translate fundamental doctrines into guidance for human action" (1993: 9).
Thirdly, ideas may also be conceived of as causal beliefs, whïch are "beliefs about
cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared authority of
recognised elites" and imply "strategies for the attainment of goals, themselves
valued because of shared principled beliefs, and understandable only within the
context of broader world views" (1993: 10). It is the conception of ideas as
principled and causal beliefs that is of interest to Goldstein and Keohane.
What purposes do ideas serve? There is typically no direct causal relationship
between ideas and policy choices, but ideas can in various ways point the way
towards a choice. Ideas serve in thissense as road maps by guiding action either
on account of principles or beliefsabout cause-effect relationships. But they only
provide this guidance under conditions of uncertainty about interests and how to
maximise them. Causal beliefs may in these circumstances reduce uncertainty and
principled beliefs may substitute for uncertainty. A sec ond purpose of ideas is,
according to Goldstein and Keohane, specifically related to rational choice
situations in which no determinate predietion is possible. Several equilibria are
possible, and the theory cannot by its own powers determine which one is to be
preferred. Ideas as shared beliefs substitute for the indeterminacy of predietions of
rational choice. Thirdly, ideas institutionalised in the shape of rules and norms
may come to have a life outlasting their initial purpose and to be seen as
immutable and undisputable. Institutionalisation of ideas may produee
institutional inerti a or at least certain lag effects as in the case of legal doctrines.
For research, the study of the contemporar significance of old rules as well as
archaeological investigations into how one set of rules was selected instead of
another would be required. The institutionalisation of ideas, furthermore, has the
implication that reasons would have to be given for seleeting one course of action
and not another. Institutionalisation does not only reduce uncertainty about
choices; ideas also introduce an element of validation as actions would have to be
justified by providing reasons.
This latter point is given an interesting sociological twist in the concept of
"epistemic communities" introduced by Peter Haas. This approach has a slightly
narower focus than that of Goldstein and Keohane while building on its central
tenets. An episternc community is "a network of professionals with recognised
expertise and competence in a parïcular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area". The defining traits
of anoepistemic community are, according to Haas, "(1) a shared set of normative
and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action
of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are deri ved from their
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analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their
domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages
between possible policyactions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of
validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and
validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy
enterprise - that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to
which their professional expertise is directed, presumably out of the conviction
that human welfare wil be enhanced as a consequence (1992: 3).
The "epistemic community" approach shares the concepts of principled and causal
beliefs and the concept of validation with Goldstein and Keohane, but adds the
important observation that ideas are not just one variable among others feeding
into the decision-makng processes of state actors, but may be embodied in expert
groups with their own common policy enterprise which then feed into the
decision-makng proeess. As with Goldstein and Keohane's conception of the role
of ideas, epistemic communities have a comparative advantage in situations of
uncertainty, when interests or power considerations do not give determinate
predictions about how to act. These situations obtain in the aftermath of a shock or
in the course of a crisis where decision-makers cannot rely on standard
assumptions about what their interests are. This is so because the knowledge
needed to determine what those interests are (and how power can come to bear on
their realisation) is simply not there.
Epistemic communities can fil the void by using their expertise "to elucidate the
cause-effect relationships and provide advIce about the likely results of alternative
courses of action", to "shed light on the nature of the complex interlinkages
between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to
take action or from instituting a particular policy". In so doing, "epistemic
communities can help define the self-interests of a state or factions within it" and
thereby "help formulate policies" (1992: 15). By their intervention in interest- and
policy-defining processes, epistemic communities reduce uncertainty and
complexity by limiting or narrowing the range of alternatives under consideration.
Their expertise is in this sense rooted in their causal beliefs, their claims to
expertise about cause-effect relationships.
How do epistemic communities differ from other groups who press claims about
substantive matters or claim to have expertise about specified issue-areas? The
crucial criterion is, as indicated above, "the combination of having a shared set of
causal and principled (analytical and normative) beliefs, a consensual knowledge
base, and a common policy enterprise (common interests)". (1992: 18). On the
first two dimensions, causal and principled beliefs, epistemic communities are
different from disciplines and professions on the grounds of principled beliefs
although both groups share causal beliefs. Conversely, epistemic communities are
different from interest groups and social movements on the grounds of causal
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beliefs although both groups share principled beliefs. Finally, epistemic
communities are different from legislators, bureaucratic agencies, and bureaucratic
coalitions on both dimensions. The same applies to vaUdation and interest, the
last two dimensions. Epistemic communities share a consensual knowledge base
by methods of internal validation with disciplines and professions, but not
interests. Conversely, epistemic communities share interests with interest groups
and social movements, but not validation methods. Finally, neither interests nor
validation methods are shared with legislators and bureaucrats.
As we noted above, the regimes approach was criticised by resting on a
behaviourist epistemology to deal with an object of study that was ontologically
intersubjective. Haas attempts to accommodate this criticism by stressing the
validation methods of epistemic communities and advocating what he calls a
limited constructivist view. It is constructivist in the sense that it recognises that
reality is socially construeted, .. but also limited in the sen se thatnot all
constructions are equally plausible but wil have to subjected to validation tests.
The view then does not advocate a correspondence theory of truth which assurnes
that there is a reality "out there" that can be fully comprehended. Instead it
advocates a "consensus theory of a finite and temporally bounded notion of truth"
which is fallibilstic in that it can be revised and modified by new insights, but
also melioristic in that "correct beliefs may evolve over time, as progressively
more accurate characterisations of the world are consensually formulated" (1992:
23).6
Haas points out that the generation of consensual knowledge is not to be equated
with the generation of truth, perhaps not even with approximations of truth. The
interesting point for Haas is that given this assumption, the group that is
responsible for articulating dimensions of reality thereby wields considerable
political and social influence, particularly in issue are as of public concern where
there is a great deal of uncertainty. However, this influence is conditioned by the
advice given really being consensual; if expertise differs on crucial issues of
public concern, their influence as a group is bound to suffer as aresult.
The advantage of this approach is that it opens up for the possibility of
organisationallearning of governments and organisations through the evolution of
consensual knowledge. But saying that a possibility exists for learning does not
say under what conditions a learning process is set in motion and what are the
steps and sequences in this process. Haas sees the main task of epistemic
communities as one .of international policy coordination and argues that they may
play an evolutionar role as a source of policy innovation and as a channel by
which these innovations may diffuse internationally. As regards the former role,
epistemic communities may frame the range of political controversy regarding an
issue and thereby define state interests by setting the agenda within which these
6 On the concepts of fallbilism and meliorism, see Skirbekk (1993).
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issues are to be considered. Furthermore, they may be involved in the setting of
standards by which state performance is to be measured and assessed. By putting
bounds on permissible behaviour and narrowing the range for political bargaining,
epistemic communities exert influence. Policy innovation can be disseminated
through the communities' own channels or by influencing state governments
individually or concertedly through transnational network connections. The timing
of policy diffusion and policy selection at the state level or internationally is of
importanee for epistemic communities to exert influence.
As we noted above, uncertainty, crisis and shock afterwaves are all propitious in
opening up for expert intervention. In their absence, policy makers are more likely
to seek expert confirmation of their (politically motivated) views than to have
them challenged or revised. In these instances, epistemic communities are more
likely to serve as mediators, but without compromising their causal beliefs.
Finally, policy persistence, thrøugh4he institutionalisation of ideas, is dependent
on the persistence of consensus among community members, but dissensus should
not be presumed to produee instant institutional adaptation, but only at a lag as
institutionalisation produces its own sense of inertia.
In sum, policy innovation, the chief servIces provided by epistemic communities,
signifies the possibility of institutionallearning capacity and hence of institutional
adaptability to the lessons drawn from such learning capacity. In Adler and Haas'
words, "changes in the epistemological assumptions and interpretations that help
frame and structure collective understanding and action constitute the most
meaningful notion of learning in international relations" (1992: 385). In fact,
processes of learning may even be at the basis of rational choice in international
relations: "Rationality thus rests on transferred meaning and experience and
should be analysed in terms of practical understandings, theories and expectations
that reflect the policymakers' current agenda of priorities" (1992: 386). The
typical outcome of a learning process would be the adoption of new instrumental
ends (new practices) and the adoption of new principledends (new goals). For
this, the causal and principled beliefs of epistemic communities serve as sources
of innovations.
An implication of this approach is to draw attention to the "framing conditions"
that are of importance to the rational pursuit of goals. In so doing, it also draws
attention to the conditions and types of rule-governed behaviour that make up the
framing conditions. While the approach focuses very much on the input side by
considering what and how epistemic communities can contribute to international
policy coordination, it may be waranted again to have a closer look at the output
side and we propose to do so by looking at the idea of multilateralism. As we
observed at the beginning of this paper, theorising on international organisation
has lost in relevanee what it may conceivably have gained in theoretical
sophistication. By analysing the concept of multilateralism, we may get a better
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idea of what multilateral organisations do (and possibly what they should be doing
provided they are given the opportunity to do so). The theoreticallessons learnt so
far should provide us with some tools to put that question (and hopefully answer
it).
The idea and uses of multilateralism
Multilateralism can be defined as a generic institutional form in international
relations, "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more
states on the basis of "generalised" principles of conduct - that is, principles which
specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the
particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in
any specific occurrence" (Ruggie 1992: 571). The definitional emphasis given to
"generalised principles of conduct that specify appropriate conduct for a class of
actions11'dearly indicates the nile-governed type ofbehaviour characteristic of this
institutional form. In fact, it is the purpose of rules to define what counts as
appropriate in a given context. According to March and Olsen, "instItutions are
concentrated around clusters of appropriate behaviour", and one criterion for
describing behaviour as rule following is appropriateness. (1989: 23ff. What
counts for appropriate behaviour in a specific situation may be, as they admit, a
non-trivial exercise, but the exercise may be made more manageable by resorting
to their second criterion, similarity, typical for legal reasoning whereinjudgements
in particular cases can be deri ved from higher-order norms and principles.
Following from the definition of multilateralism, "generalised principles of
conduct logically entail an indivisibilty among the members of a collectivity with
respect to the range of behaviour in question". Indivisibility is here to be
understood as socially constrcted, i.e. as intersubjectively attained consensus on
appropriate behaviour. Secondly, "successful cases of multilateralism in practice
appear to generate among members ...expectations of "diffuse reciprocity" (1992:
571), in the sense of aggregate benefits over time. As Ruggie admits;
"multilateralism is a highly demanding institutional form" (1992: 572) and its
historical incidence should therefore be presumed to be relatively less frequent
than the alternatives of bilateralism or unilateralism.
Multilateralism comes in different forms. Ruggie enumerates three: orders,
regimes and organisations. For these to be multilateral, they would have to be seen
as specifications of "constitutive rules that order relations in given domains of
internationallife" ,i.e. as open-access and non-exclusionar arrangements. Orders
would most closely approximate multilateralism as such, whereas regimes are
functional or sectoral specification of orders and organisations are physical,
administrative entities. The historical trend has been in the direction of a "move to
institutions", particularly to formal organisations in the 20th century. In former
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centuries coordination and collaboration among states rarely resulted in formal
organisations.
With the advent of formal organisations, coordination and collaboration takes on a
new character as organisatIons now play an active role as champions of
coordinatIon and collaboration themselves and put items on the agenda on which
there may not a prior normative consensus. With these formal organisations a
multilateral politicalorder has emerged capable of handling collective tasks in an
ex-ante coordinated manner, but in that process, possibly complicated the lives of
individual states as well, at least on some presumptions about state action. And as
Ruggie concedes, he has not found any good explanations in the literature for why
states would want to have their lives complicated in this manner. Clearly some
explanations seem to be called for. Ruggie's own explanation, which primarily
draws on US experiences, points in the direction of fairly strong international
forces and compatible US domestic arrangements in the cases of post-war
economic and security affairs. The bipolarity of the world and the US status as a
hegemonial power lends support to this thesis, but loses explanatory force in the
current context of mult-polarity and the absence of a hegemonial power. Ruggie
finds that there is not much in the theoretical literature to account for this
durability and persistence, but as we shall see below, that may be a result of
searching for explanations in the wrong literature.
One possible explanation for the persistenee of multilateralism in the current state
of affairs may be to turn the explanation around, namely that "the very features
that make it strategically difficult to establish multilateral arrangements in the first
place may enhance the durability and adaptabilty of these arangements once they
are in place" (1992: 594). These factors have to do with the expectations of diffuse
reciprocity which are less dependent on any hegemonial power than was
previously assumed. Secondly, "an arrangement based on generalised organising
principles should be more elastic than one based on particularistic interests and
situational exigencies" and therefore more adaptable to changing cIrcumstances
and power shifts. Thirdly, as already mentioned, much of the institutional
innovations come from the multilateral arangements themselves and the EU
provides the most ready-made example on this score. And it is Ruggie's basic
thesis that it is the fact that international institutions are multilateral in form that
explain their durabilty and abilty to adapt to change.
However, this latter point on adaptability should not be taken too literally. As
Caporaso argues, "the economicapproach to institutions stresses the overall fit of
institutions to the environment. The emergence of and changes in organisations
are efficient respons es to environmental challenges. Institutional arguments often
stress the contingent, path-dependent nature of institutional change. These
arguments generally assume a narative form in which timing and sequences
matter" (1992: 627). These two approaehes suggest two views of history. The
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former has a view of history as efficient wherein "institutions may offer some
frictional resistance, but in the end they can be incorporated into the general model
of allocative efficiency" (1992: 627) and suggests similar institutional outcomes.
The functional approach would always presume proeesses of reequilbration as
institutions resp ond to pressures from the environment. However, as Caporaso
notes, the method of comparative statics drives out narrative and rejects the
alternative view of history as contÏngent. This view which is central to "the
institutional approach is more attuned to variations in initial conditions and to the
sequences in which events occur" (1992: 628) and speaks of timing and
path-dependence in the sense of present standard operating procedures being the
products of historical choices. To put things in this way is perhaps to say that
something occurred the way it did because of x implies that things would have
been different in the absence of x. Without wishing to eng age in counterfactuals,
asking this question would seem to imply that the presence of x is bound to have
effects on behaviour that are different from what would result in the absence of x
or in the presence of some alternative arangement.
Institutions do affect behaviour then, but what are they more precisely and what
does an institutional approach mean? In the course of this paper we have given
some indications of the characteristics of this approach, and, following Caporaso,
we may draw some of these threads together. First, the institutional approach has
an ontological dimension which has to do with the status of entities, particularly
individual agents and institutions. The approach does admit that "the individual
may provide the microcomponent of institutional theory, but social relations and
institutions are not seen as products of freely choosing individuals; instead, agency
is given a structural determination" (1992: 623). That does not mean determinism
in the sense that individuals are mindless reproducers of structures nor does it
mean that institutions are by-products of individual utilty maximisation. Rather,
"institutions are treated as a level of organised complexity: they are distinct from
the sum of individuals composing them, yet they rest on a basis of human action
that are continually contested, are only parly propelled by norms and role
expectations, and always reflect atension between the desires of individuals and
the needs of institutions" (1992: 623). That institutions have needs may sound
counter-intuitive, but in this notion of need lies an recognition that one important,
perhaps the most important, institutÏonal prerogative is its own survival in its
relation to pressures from the environment and that this prerogative may not
coincide with the desires of individual members of the institution.
Secondly, institutÏons have. a theoreticaZ dimension which has to do with the
specification of the proper relations between preferences, institutions, norms and
ideas or beliefs. The important thing to note is that the institutional approach sees
preferences not as exogenously given, but as endogenously malleable. Institutions
shape preferences by altering the pay-off matrix and thereby making it easier to
punish free-riders and defectors and by providing an environment for socialisation
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and learning. This environment of contacts, exchange of information and learning
have an impact on both the substantive content of beliefs (principled beliefs) and
on how to realise them (causal beliefs). Moreover, it tends to reduce uncertainty
about the behaviour of others as the institutional environment provides the
stabilty needed to make reliable predictions about their behaviour (and hence how
to respond in turn). Finally, institutions have prescriptive roles by defining what
counts as appropriate behaviour. These norms and standards would be outside the
preference structure of individuals in the sense of prescribing what ought to be
done instead of what would be desirable to do given preferences to that effect.
However, prescriptions may condition preferences by delimiting the range of
permissible behaviour and they may also conceivably coincide with preferences as
individuals may find it desirable to do what one ought to do.
Thirdly, institutions have an interpretative dimension which has to do with how to
understand cooperation. On the institutionalist view, there are "complex patterns
of cooperation already embedded within states and the interstate system" in the
shape of diplomatic language, norms and rules and most basically in the
recognition of sovereignty and the system of states. In fact, it is an institutionalist
argument that to speak of states and state interests, there would have to be an
agreement that state sovereignty has to be respected in order for states to pursue
their interests vis a vis other states or via international mediaries. For the
institutional approach, "the starting point is a social conception of the actors, and
the basic questions have to do with how the system of states can reproduce itself,
what tensions it incorporates, and what capacity it has for altering its structures
and rules to deal with changing environmental pressures" (1992: 626). It follows
that these practÏces are often constÏtutÏve of states' identities and interests and they
of ten proceed in a trial-and-error fashion rather than according to a premeditated
ratÏonal plan. If these assumptions are correct, the methodological emphasis shifts
from "strategic interaction with given (and fixed utilities) to a model of debate,
communication, persuasion, argument and discursive legitimation" (1992: 626f.)
According to Kratochwil: "Most of our arguments concerning policy or rights are
not so much about the determination of the likely result, given a certain
distribution of 'preferences', as they are debates over which preferences deserve
priority over others, which ones ought to be changed, and which judgement
deserves out assent. Here the overall persuasive 'weight of claims rather than
their logical necessity or aggregation is at issue" (1988: 12).
None of this is to be construed as leaving no ro om for rational calculus. The point
is rather to indicate the framing conclitions for the playing-out of rational
calculation and the essentially bounded nature of rationality. What is ruled out,
however, is the notion of an anarchIcal state of nature, domestically as well as
internationally, that is often taken to be the basis for social cooperation. WhIle in
social contract theory, notions of the state of nature are taken to be hypothetical
'devices of representation' , in internatÏonal relations theory anarchy is often taken
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to describe an actual state of affairs, and this assumption cannot be accepted by
the institutional approach.
In sum, the above dimensions point in the direction of an approach that has been
relatively neglected in theorising about international organisation in recent years,
and that is the subject of the concluding section.
International organisation as organisations
At the outset of this paper, it was complained that the study of international
organisation has progressively (or should it be regressively?) moved away from
the study of actual international organisations. While realist theory has been
sceptical about the possibility of cooperation tout court, functionalist theory has
spoken of the demand for international organisation, but both approaches have
beennegligent about the conditionsof supplyof international organisations. It
may seem trivial to point out that the staring point for the study of international
organisation ought plausibly to be international organisations, but as we have
seen, research has tended to concentrate on forms of international cooperation
short of actual organisations. The realist and functionalist approaches, despite
differences in assumptions, have taken the viewpoint of states and se en
organisations. as creatures of dominant states with little independent capacity for
initiative or effectiveness. The organisation of international relations rather than
the organisations of the international system have been the objects of research.
The myopic focus on state action has been appropriate for a discipline that sees
Itself as practising "Staatswissenchaft".
On the other hand, sociologists from Weber onwards have studied complex
organisations such as bureaucracIes and business corporations either domestically
or comparatively across countries, but they have rarely studied complex
organisations at the internationallevel and possibly doubted the very existence of
an international society. There are exceptions, of course, particularly in the
adoption by political scientists of functionalist theory and Immanuel W allers tein ' s
work on the modern world system (1974). Most of those who see themselves as
organisation theorists have tended to study organisations either domestically or
comparatively. However, there should be no reason why the insights derived from
these studies could not be applied to international organisations. The reason has
been, as we have said, that the theories have built on the assumption that
cooperation across borders is that much harder to achieve than cooperation within
borders. If the assumption. iS'Telaxed, then it should not betoo difficult to imagine
that organisations once established internationally, would function as
organisations in ways similar to national, domestic organisations. All it requires is
to shift the viewpoint from that of the state in the international system to that of
the organisation and its institutional environment.
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It would be beyond the scope of this paper to describe this approach, because as an
approach in international relations theory it hardly exists. The preceding section
gave some pointers on how it might be worked up, but the working up remains to
be done. Here only some of the elements of this potential approach can be
elucidated, drawing on an interesting contribution by Ness and Brechin (1988).
Their main point is that international organisations cannot be conceived of as
mechanical tools of action in the hands of state actors, but only, in Selznick's
phrase (1949, 1957), as at the best recalcitrant tools of action. Organisations must
rather be seen, in Ness and Brechin's view, as "live collectivities interacting with
their environments, and they contain members who seek to use the organisation
for their own ends, of ten struggling with others over the content and allocation of
the product" (1988: 247). In addition to being living collectivities with their own
agendas, they also differ over time, they perform differently from one another,
they achieve their ends with varying degrees of effectiveness and efficiency and
they differ in their goals. All these variations must beconsidered and explained in
working up theories of international organisations.
Ness and Brechin lists four factors that may be of importance in explaining
organisational performance; organisational environments, technology, structure
and goals. First, environments have an impact on organisational performance, but
environments vary. One insight from organisation theory, from contingency theory
associated with Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), is that there is no best way to
organise anything as structure and process are contingent upon the environment
and technology. Similarly, Meyer and Scott's work (1992, 1993) on the
'institutional environment' points to organisations being shaped, inter alia, by the
environment' s rule and belief systems. Environments have to do with expectations
about organisational performance and these expectations have consequences for
organisational structure. In an environment characterised by heterogeneous and
unstable expectations, a flat, functional organisational structure is better suite d to
deal with them than a hierarchical, centralised structure which is better suited to
deal with an environment of stable and homogeneous expectations. Moreover,
environments for international organisations may not on1y be states, but also
non-governmental organisations and business corporations.
In my own work on the International Labour Organisation, I have singled out what
I caU three arenas of interaction. They are the governance arenas where the
organisation interacts with its member states, but also with employers' and
workers' organisations due to its tripartite structure; the secretariat where
organisational priorities 'are made in terms ofpersonnel and budget; and thirdly,
the technical assistance arena where the organisation interacts with donors and
recipients. States thus act both as members and as donors/recipients in their
interactions with the organisation and their expectations as to the performance of
the organisation may accordingly differ according to what "hat" they are wearing
at any specific time. Moreover, as members and as donors/recipients states may be
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represented by different ministries or departments. Heterogeneous expectations
can enhance organisational autonomy by providing room to manoeuvre.
Secondly, organisations may be characterised by possessing a core technology
which should be defined in a broad way as the organisation' s repository of
material, skills and knowledge. This notion of a core technology is very much
present in the concept of functÏonal or sectoral organisation, or within the UN
system, of specialised agencies. By being specialised, they enjoy a comparative
advantage to other organisations by virtue of that specialisation. However,
technologies diffuse and evolve and the competences change as aresult.
Technologies also impact on organisational structure with complex technology
requiring more dependence on professionals and less routinisable technologies
disposing for a flatter organisational structure. Moreover, political contestations
can erupt over what constitutes the functional domain of an organisation. If the
domainispurely a matter of coordination, such as postal and telecommunications,
then it is likely to cause less political contestations than if organisations are
allowed to autonomously map out their domain, as in labour or educatÏon. Both
UNESCO and ILO were accused of "politicisation", meaning straying beyond
their functional domain. Unclear domains may also signify turf battles as any
knowledge observer would know whenever the UN system urges the need for
coordination.
Thirdly, organisatÏons have goals whïch on one reading may be their own.survival
when they come to be seen as ends in themselves. Members, as noted, may have
goals that differ from those of the organisation, and factions may come to define
the organisation' s goals as in Cyert and March' s concept of a dominant coalition
(1963, 1992). These readings say that organisations may come to embrace goals
that do not have anything in common with those it was created to accomplish.
However, those goals justifying its creation may not be compatible. Etzioni (1961,
1975) has argued that organisations are there to deliver goods and services, but
also to create (and promote) a new set of values and attitudes. Value change
requires a normative compliance structure whereas the delivery of goods and
services require a utlitarian compliance structure. As Ness and Brechin argue,
"empirical questions about the performanee of international organisations can be
solved only by careful examination of what they are charged to do, and the extent
to which their charges impose conflicting demands on them" (1988: 266). In the
case of the ILO, its value goals relate to the promotion of international labour
standards, but it also provides technical assistance as a UN development agency.
These goals may not only conflïct with each other on specific occasions, but they
also provide different standards for measuring organisation performance.
Fourthly, organisational structure may have a bearing on performance, and UN
organisations vary to the degree the UN system tends to impose a tall, hierarchical
structure on them. This structure guarantees a high degree of procedural
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rationality, but of ten at the expense of flexibilty and rapidity of response to
environmental demands. Therefore, decentralisation of functions to the field level
has made them more effective in providing goods and services, but this is of
course contingent upon whether provisioning is mainly what they are charged to
do. An organisation involved in data gathering, proeessing and global monitoring
as well as in conference diplomacy would need to have astrong headquarers
presence. Normally, some form of decentralisation is undertaken to respond more
rapidly to requests for services. To take the example of the ILO, the organs
charged with supervision of the compliance of states with international labour
standards are at the headquarters level, but in order to better provide advice to
constituents, experts were posted at the regional offices. On the other hand,
flexibilty and adequate respons e may be enhanced by organisations entering into
networks, as Jonnson (1995) has pointed out, wherein each organisation may
complement the others in strcture and in technology.
These keywords do not a theory make, but it is the conclusion of this paper that
theory-building in international organisation theory adequate to the task would
have to look in this direction for the right tools for the job.
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